Spain's International Integration: NATO and European Accession

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International Integration: NATO and Europe

During the transition period, domestic politics predominated over foreign affairs. In reality, for the majority of Spaniards, democratization was synonymous with Europeanization and Western integration. During the transition and the Socialist government, there was essential continuity in foreign policy planning.

Foreign Policy Under Arias Navarro

Under Arias Navarro, the relevance of foreign policy was minimal. However, the King's trips to Europe and the USA helped fuel expectations and had a positive effect on important internal policy initiatives. A significant foreign policy decision was the King's resignation of the privilege of intervention in the appointment of bishops, a long-standing request from the Pope.

The Adolfo Suárez Era

During the time of Adolfo Suárez, the process of normalizing Spanish international relations took place:

  • January 1979: Four agreements were signed between the state and the Church.
  • Diplomatic Restoration: Diplomatic relations were restored with all Eastern European countries.
  • USA Relations: A new agreement was reached with the USA in May 1982.

Entry into the European Common Market was the most urgent priority for the young Spanish democracy, serving as the logical correlate to the country's political transformation. The request to open negotiations occurred immediately after the 1977 elections, and in early 1978, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was appointed minister without portfolio dedicated to this issue. Integration was vital, as Spain conducted half of its exports and imports (excluding oil) with Europe. However, negotiations were hindered by divergent interests, particularly those of France.

The Calvo-Sotelo Administration and NATO

The rise to power of Calvo-Sotelo marked a more Western-oriented shift in Spanish foreign policy. The request for NATO membership took place in June 1981, which broke the existing consensus on foreign policy. Calvo-Sotelo's decision, however, was irreversible. Spain's proposal was viewed with suspicion by the Soviet Union. Domestically, the move was supported by the UCD and the Catalan and Basque nationalist right, but the PSOE's fierce opposition caused significant government deterioration.

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