Plato and Aristotle: Reality, Being, and Causality
Classified in Philosophy and ethics
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On Reality (Physical and Metaphysical)
Let's examine the contrasting views of Plato and Aristotle on reality, being, and causality.
Indicators of Reality
For Plato, reality resides in the realm of Ideas (universals). These Ideas are transcendent, existing separately from the empirical world. They possess a strong ontological status, captured through dialectic. In contrast, Aristotle emphasized primary substance (specific things). He saw form as immanent to matter, inextricably linked to it. While he acknowledged an extra-mental reality captured by understanding and expressed in language, it wasn't independent of matter (moderate ontologism).
The Nature of Being
Plato's concept of Being mirrors Parmenides' attributes, now ascribed to Ideas: unity, immutability, perfection, etc. Aristotle, however, proposed that "being" is said in many ways. He posited a correspondence between being and language, allowing linguistic analysis to reveal the self's expressions and construct a predictive science. Being is understood as:
- Subject and predicate (entity and accidents: categories)
- Primary substance (specific being) and secondary substance (genera and species)
- Act and potency
- Present being or potential being
Similarly, non-being is either absolute or relative. The unity of being is maintained because all action takes precedence, enabling an analogy among different forms of manifested being.
The Problem of Motion
Plato initially viewed movement in the empirical world as an imperfect reflection of the intelligible world, a mere appearance. However, he later showed greater interest in physics. Aristotle explained motion as the actualization of potential residing within the primary substance. He prioritized the study of physics and natural beings, conceiving these ideas as epistemic.
The Question of Causes
Plato believed the intelligible world is the formal cause of everything observed empirically. The Idea of the Good serves as both formal and final cause (incipient teleologism). The Demiurge acts as the efficient cause. Aristotle identified four causes: material, formal, efficient (agent), and final. He prioritized the final cause (full teleologism), with the Unmoved Mover, pure act, the object of love and desire, absolute reality, perfect and finished, serving as the ultimate final cause and, consequently, the efficient cause.