Hume's Moral Philosophy: Utility, Sentiment, and the Critique of Reason

David Hume's Empirical Ethics and Moral Sentiment

David Hume first addressed ethics in the second and third books of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Many years later, he extracted and refined these ideas in a shorter essay entitled An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751).

Hume's approach to moral problems is fundamentally empirical. Instead of prescribing how morality should operate, he explains how moral judgments are actually made. After providing several examples, he concludes that most (if not all) of the behaviors analyzed have in common that they seek to increase utility and welfare.

Unlike his fellow empiricist Thomas Hobbes, Hume declares that we make moral judgments not only in light of our own interest but also that of our fellow citizens. Hume argues in his moral theory that we can never make moral judgments based on reason alone. Our reason deals with facts and draws conclusions from them, but it cannot lead us to choose one option over another; only feelings can. This argument against morality based on reason is today a core component of antirealist arguments.

The Rejection of Practical Reason

Consequently, Hume denies the existence of "practical reason" and the possibility of a rational foundation for ethics. The objects of morality (passions, volitions, and actions) are not capable of agreement or disagreement with ideas based on truth and falsehood.

If reason cannot be the source of value judgments, the source must be found in the feeling that arises spontaneously in us when we morally evaluate actions. Analysis reveals that this feeling is a form of pleasure or "liking." This leads him to exclude all traces of austere moralism or the mortification of the soul or body, because the purpose of morality is the happiness and joy of living for as many people as possible.

Hume on Religion and Divinity

Hume also addresses the problem of religion. He undermines claims of evidence for the existence of God, often appealing to the problem of evil in the world. He posits that religion has its origin in people's fear and ignorance regarding the causes of terrible natural events.

In his book The Natural History of Religion, he defends an evolution from polytheism up to the abstract idea of divinity found in monotheistic religions.