Hume's Ethics: The Foundation of Moral Sentiment

David Hume's Critique of Rational Morality

Hume's Criticisms of Rational Morality

Sentiment as the Foundation of Morality

Hume believed that reason can discern whether something is good or bad, but it is unable to influence human behavior. Therefore, reason cannot be the sole source of good and evil. One example Hume provides is that of ingratitude. He argues that ingratitude is considered a significant moral transgression, especially when it harms the benefactor. What condemns such a horrible attitude? It is not merely an argument, but an inner feeling. This illustrates that similar actions in other kingdoms (animal and plant) do not evoke the same moral rejection. For example, when a tree drops a seed and grows into another, often surpassing and destroying the parent tree, is the second tree condemned for the destruction of the parent? Absolutely not. However, although the underlying relationship might be similar, in the human case, we feel hatred and anger, while in the natural world, we feel indifference. This parallels the concept of incest, considered a criminal action among humans but not among animals.

These examples demonstrate that morality is not determined by reason but by sentiment. It is sentiments that encourage us to act, and reason must obey and serve them. Moral sentiment is an approval or rejection that arises in response to certain actions and ways of being. It is selfless and natural.

The Is-Ought Problem and Naturalistic Fallacy

Another criticism Hume levels against moral rationalists concerns the illegitimate "is-ought" problem. This fallacy is often called the naturalistic fallacy: it is an illegitimate move to infer from a statement about what is (e.g., "the virtuous man finds pleasure in helping others") to a statement about what ought to be (e.g., "man must be virtuous"). Similarly, one cannot logically move from "man is not a means to an end" to "man should not be a means to achieve an end." Where does this new prescriptive relationship ("ought") originate? It cannot be logically derived from descriptive statements ("is").

Moral Emotivism and Reason's Role

Since good and bad do not originate from reason but from sentiment, morality is something more profound than mere judgment. This position has been termed moral emotivism: something is considered good when it evokes pleasant feelings and gives pleasure, and conversely, something is wrong when it is unpleasant and painful. Actions that are useful to society are approved, while those harmful to it are frowned upon. Reason, in Hume's view, plays a crucial role in establishing which actions are useful to society and which are not. Thus, Hume attributes a significant, albeit secondary, role to reason in ethics.