Hume's Emotivism: The Role of Feelings in Moral Judgments

Hume's Emotive Moral Theory

Hume's moral theory is a key part of his plan to build a science of human nature with scientific rigor comparable to that achieved by Newton in the natural sciences. The science of human nature does not end with the explanation of knowledge, but must include a justification of the principles governing human behavior.

Hume's ethical theory is based on the refusal to accept that reason can be the foundation of moral life. Moral rationalism has been the dominant ethical explanation since the beginning of philosophy, with the exception of the moral theory of the Sophists. Hume considers that moral rationalism has made an error, as it confuses the field of theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy by not drawing clear borders between them.

Theoretical vs. Practical Philosophy

• Theoretical philosophy and science, in general, are concerned with "being." The human faculty responsible for this area is reason.
• Practical philosophy, however, deals with "ought." Ethics are not interested in how things are done or conduct, but how they should be. Practical philosophy is the realm of feeling and emotions.

The error – the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" – is to claim a conclusion in the field of ethics based on statements of facts and using reason for this. This, according to Hume, has led to the loss of any proper moral philosophy.

Emotivism and Moral Sentiments

Hume is the chief representative of moral emotivism. Moral sentiments determine human behavior in the sense of promoting or condemning certain actions, and reason is unable to fulfill this role. Rational modes of knowledge are limited to relations between ideas and knowledge of facts. Knowing the relationship between two ideas or things does not help you decide what to do or judge what others do.

Hume believes that moral judgments depend on the pleasure or pain that certain actions awaken in people. Good is associated with a sensation of pleasure, and evil with the opposite. Passions, not reason, lead to the formation of the moral conscience. The mission of reason in the realm of morality is limited to working with the passions, by serving them. Reason may help spark a passion or establish some order among several of them. But it is the passions that imprint a moral value or conduct an assessment.

Moral Pleasure and Pain

Hume took special interest in distinguishing moral pleasure and pain from other kinds of pleasure and pain. There are hedonistic pleasures – such as that experienced with a good hot bath – and altruistic pleasures – like you feel when you see someone risking their life to save a child.

The pleasure and pain associated with moral behavior are selfless and closely linked to feelings of empathy that Hume believes are inherent in human nature. Moral distinctions are rooted in the human capacity to take the place of another to experience feelings figuratively.