US v Haggar: Duty Exemption Dispute

Facts:

The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the US from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the US and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. The US Customs Service claimed that the baking process, in addition to assembly, denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor.

Issue:

Is the US Customs Service's regulation regarding permapressing entitled to judicial deference?

Rule:

Under HTUS, if the trousers had only been sewn and reshipped, they would have been eligible for the duty exception that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the US.

Application:

The Court did not expressly answer the question. The Court vacated and remanded the case. The Court concluded that the regulation in question was subject to further analysis. Additionally, the Court held that if the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, then it required judicial deference in the Court of International Trade. The judgment is VACATED, and the case is remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion.

Facts:

The Glens alleged that Club Med reaped a profit of many millions of dollars from a wrongful occupation and use of their property from 1997 into 2003. In 2003, Club Med turned over its interest in the resort to an unidentified third party. The Glens asserted three claims against Club Med: unjust enrichment and trespass (based on Florida law) and the third that Club Med violated TWEA by engaging in business transactions prohibited by that federal statute. The District court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Glens are barred by the act of state doctrine from recovering on the state law claims and that the TWEA does not provide a private right of action.

Application:

Act of state doctrine requires that the courts deem valid the Cuban government's expropriation of the real property at issue in this case. The Glens cannot maintain their claims for trespass and unjust enrichment against Club Med.