Establishing Property Rights with Proprietary Estoppel

Classified in Law & Jurisprudence

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Claiming an Interest in Property

In advising [the claimant], the question arises as to whether she would be able to claim any interest in the flat which [the landowner] stated in his will was to be given to a charity. It is quite obvious she wants to continue staying in the flat and, therefore, she needs to establish a beneficial interest in the property. If she only has a license, that would serve her no purpose, as it is purely personal permission and does not bind any third party.

The best avenue for her to establish an interest in the property is to prove she has a claim based on Proprietary Estoppel. Raising a Constructive Trust or Resulting Trust might be quite difficult, as she had not made any direct financial contribution to the property's purchase.

The Core Elements of Proprietary Estoppel

In order to establish a claim for Proprietary Estoppel, a few elements need to be proven. As established by Justice Oliver in Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees, the claimant must show that a representation was made by the landowner, which they relied upon to their detriment, making it unconscionable for the landowner to go back on his promise or representation.

H3: Representation

The representation can be made either by words or conduct and can be either active or passive. The representation must be such as to lead the claimant to believe that they have or would acquire an interest in the property. Courts have also recognised testamentary assurances or promises as valid representations.

H3: Detrimental Reliance

The claimant must have relied on the landowner's statement and changed her position to her detriment. The change of her position must have been influenced or induced by the representation made. Key principles from case law include:

  • Lord Denning in Greasley v Cooke stated that if a representation was calculated to influence a reasonable person, then the courts would presume that the claimant was also influenced by it.
  • According to Campbell v Griffin, the change of position can be for more than one reason.

On the facts of the case, we must ask: did she change her position to her detriment? Examples of this could include:

  1. Giving up a job, leading to a lack of financial support.
  2. Having no alternative accommodation.
  3. Relocating to a new environment.

While there is a change in position, she did not pay for the flat, as everything was undertaken by [the landowner]. However, as stated in Grundt v Great Boulder Goldmines, the real detriment and unconscionability only arise when the promise is revoked.

H3: Unconscionability and Remedies

Has the claimant established the necessary elements of equity: representation, reliance, detriment, and unconscionability? If yes, the court must decide on a remedy. The judge can make an order based on:

  • Expectation Basis: Giving the claimant what was promised. In Pascoe v Turner, since she was expecting to get the house, she was awarded the fee simple.
  • Reliance Basis: Compensating the claimant for the detriment suffered. In Jennings v Rice, the award was proportionate to the detriment.

The concept of unconscionability is central, as seen in Gillet v Holt, where the court awarded Mr. Gillet the farmhouse and £100,000 to satisfy the equity, while the rest of the property remained with Mr. Holt.

Alternative Claims: Trusts and Co-Ownership

If the claimant had provided, for example, 20% of the purchase price, a direct financial contribution would give rise to a resulting or constructive trust. The courts would automatically apply this, and she would become a co-owner in equity. This principle is supported by cases under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA), such as Bull v Bull, Dyer v Dyer, and Burns v Burns. With a direct financial contribution, a 20% share would likely make her a co-owner without needing to prove the elements of estoppel.

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