Descartes' Doubt and Russell's Challenge to the Self
Classified in Philosophy and ethics
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Textual Analysis Introduction
This analysis examines a philosophical text, identifying three distinct arguments or perspectives. We will delve into the core ideas, providing detailed commentary and highlighting significant aspects. The following sections present a comprehensive content analysis.
Descartes' Method of Doubt
In the first section, Descartes introduces the method of doubt, questioning everything that is not clearly and distinctly perceived. This process continues until a certain and secure foundation is reached: the very existence of the self. He pushes this approach to its limit with the hypothesis of the evil genius, who constantly deceives the senses, presenting an unreal reality.
The Certainty of "Cogito, Ergo Sum"
Descartes argues that if one did not exist, no evil genius could deceive. Therefore, the very existence of the thinking subject cannot be doubted, as this is the sole certainty: "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito, ergo sum). From this foundational certainty, Descartes begins to reconstruct the world he had previously doubted, demonstrating that subjective truths can be undeniably real. He suggests that reason (the subject) offers greater certainty than experience (objective reality).
Russell's Critique of the Cartesian Self
Finally, Bertrand Russell critiques the Cartesian argument, questioning what it truly asserts about reality. Descartes posits a permanent, real 'I' about which he has absolute certainty, irrespective of particular experiences. Russell counters that the only immediate certainty is the existence of a momentary being – a 'something' that experiences. This momentary 'being' may not be the same 'I' from one experience to the next. Consequently, Russell argues it is impossible to define the self as something 'real' beyond any specific experience, much like there is no 'real' table existing independently of what one perceives through the senses.