David Hume's Moral Emotivism: A Deep Dive

David Hume: Moral Emotivism and the Foundation of Ethics

Location: D. Hume belongs to the period of modern philosophy, namely the current empiricist who argues that the origin and limits of knowledge is experience. D. Hume tried to achieve for human science what Newton did for the natural sciences. On the other hand, he defended the theory of moral emotivism against theories that placed reason as the foundation of morality.

Theme: To make moral judgments about someone, we turn away from domestic courts and go for a universal principle of human constitution itself with which we agree.

Ideas:

1. When someone calls another a rival, opponent, or adversary, they are expressing feelings from their particular circumstances.
2. When we say of someone that they are vicious, hateful, or depraved, we establish these qualifiers from feelings that we would all agree upon.
3. As such, a man of moral judgments must deviate from the standpoint of the private and particular, and move to some universal principle of the human constitution to which all agree.
4. If we make a moral assessment by reference to what is harmful to society, then we have adopted this common view and the principle of humanity that all men concur.

List of Ideas: In the paper, it is argued the thesis that moral judgments should not find their foundation in particular instances or the individual, but in a principle common to all mankind. Hume sets out to argue the case as follows: That when someone qualifies a rival, opponent, or enemy, we are doing so from an egotistical standpoint. This first premise leads Hume to say that for that reason, when we say of a man that he is vicious, heinous, or depraved, we are leaving the private entity to express this feeling with which everyone would agree. For all, the text concludes by saying that if our moral qualifications are to see someone from conduct detrimental to the society (criteria used), then we touched the principle of humanity in which we can all attend.

Explanation of Hume's Moral Emotivism

In this paper, D. Hume exposes some of the ideas that form the basis of their moral emotivism. As we can see in this passage, it is argued that the foundation of our moral judgments lies in the expression of feelings we all would share, dethroning reason as a guide and director of moral actions. What drives the action, according to Hume, are the passions, and they will become the criterion by which to distinguish between virtue and vice.

But in the text, the author urges that we distinguish between an individual assessment, the result of the expression of feelings related to our personal circumstances, and a universal moral judgment that expresses feelings (not reasoning), dropping the point of view of egoism and appealing to a universal principle on which all agree. Morality, therefore, requires a selfless attitude, outside interests and preferences, or governed by a criterion of social utility as stated at the end of the text. All these are ideas that can be ascribed to Hume within theories of moral sense, since he thinks that "reason is but a servant of the passions." The only thing that moves the work from the moral point of view are the passions, and they push us to desire or reject an object in terms of the pleasure or pain it produces. Thus, in distinguishing what is virtuous from what is not, reason has nothing to say since its job is not to oblige but of knowing. It is for this reason that moral judgments cannot come from reason but of passion as a moral sentiment.

The Universal Quality of Moral Sentiment

However, as stated in the text, this feeling that certain actions awaken morally is not changing and relative but a universal quality of the soul. This is a common principle in which all mankind, in principle, coincides.

Social Utility and Sympathy in Hume's Moral Philosophy

Finally, as stated earlier in this paragraph, D. Hume noted in the text the importance of a criterion of social utility when making moral judgments about the actions of a person. What is pernicious to society is considered morally wrong and therefore vicious. The quality that enables human beings to pass from an individual perspective to a social one, that is, to share and understand the tendencies and feelings of others, is sympathy. This quality comes from the similarity with which nature has created human beings, allowing us to overcome self-love and concern for the good or the suffering of others. Hume, therefore, established as the cause of our feelings of moral approval or disapproval the utility (common interest), thus anticipating utilitarian theories that bet that the moral value of an action resides in the fact of achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number.