Philosophical Theories of Truth Explained

Theories of Truth in Philosophy

Throughout history, various attempts have been made to define, explain, and understand what it means for something to be true.

The Pragmatic Theory of Truth

Pragmatism accepts the theory of fitness, but interprets it by taking into consideration the usefulness of statements in solving the problems of life. William James understood adecuación (adequacy) in the sense that it serves a purpose, works in an appropriate manner within a certain context, or is useful for a specific end. Therefore, understanding truth as suitability and adaptation, a statement is true if it is able to solve problems or meet needs. It is, therefore, a dynamic conception of truth, because truth is not a property acquired once and for all, but rather the consequence of a process.

The Coherence Theory of Truth

This theory was formulated by Hegel. It uses coherence as the criterion for the truth of a proposition, whose truth depends on its possible or impossible incorporation into the set of propositions that we already hold to be true. Any new knowledge, whether in science or in everyday life, is built upon the body of knowledge already possessed, and is considered true if it can be integrated. It is, therefore, a contextual approach, by virtue of which nothing is true or false in isolation; rather, our body of knowledge is essentially referential and connected to the rest of the system of knowledge to which it belongs.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth

Also known as the theory of fitness, this concept traces back to Aristotle, who stated: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false." In this formula, the elements involved in the act of knowing are contained: what is (the object) and "to say" (the subject and their representation of the object). Truth is understood as a special relationship of ajuste (fit) between these two elements, which is called correspondence or fitness.

This is the spontaneous concept of truth: the correlation between what people say about something and what that something actually is. This correspondence cannot be material, because objects do not physically enter our minds when we know them; rather, it is a formal correspondence established between the representation we have of the object and the object itself.

Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, placed this formal correspondence between the object and our representation of it, expressing it in these words: "Truth is the correspondence between the intellect and the thing."

In the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein placed this correspondence between facts and the formal linguistic structure, stating: "We make to ourselves pictures of facts."