David Hume's Moral Emotivism: Feelings, Not Reason, Shape Morality

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David Hume's Moral Emotivism

The Science of Human Nature

David Hume, a figure of the Enlightenment, championed freedom, tolerance, and the suppression of superstition and fanaticism. As a radical British empiricist, alongside Locke and Berkeley, Hume believed in developing a science of human nature to further knowledge. This science aimed to explain human understanding through a critical review of knowledge, based on the empiricist principle that all knowledge comes from experience. Hume's analysis led him to phenomenalism and skepticism, asserting that we only know perceptions, reducing reality to mere phenomena. He questioned the possibility of knowing anything beyond perceptions with certainty, except for mathematical knowledge. This moderate skepticism acknowledges the limits of certainty while still allowing for belief in the world and the self.

Moral Emotivism

In moral philosophy, Hume is a key figure in moral emotivism. This theory posits that moral feelings, rather than reason, drive human behavior, leading us to promote or condemn certain actions. Moral terms express feelings arising from a shared perspective.

The Common Viewpoint

When someone labels another as an "enemy" or "rival," they express feelings stemming from their specific circumstances. However, when someone calls another "vicious" or "morally depraved," they use different language, expressing feelings that resonate with a broader audience. When we identify moral conduct, we adopt a common viewpoint.

Explanation of Hume's Moral Emotivism

Hume's moral theory is part of his broader project to establish a science of human nature. He rejects the traditional view that reason is the foundation of morality, arguing instead that moral feelings determine our morality. The contemplation of virtuous actions evokes approval, while vicious actions evoke rejection. These feelings of attraction or rejection, approval (virtue) or disapproval (vice), guide our actions.

As Hume suggests, when someone uses terms like "vicious" or "depraved," they expect their audience to share their feelings. Moral terms express feelings arising not from individual situations but from a common perspective. This shared perspective transcends initial selfishness, allowing us to connect emotionally with others. Through interactions, we develop our own feelings while contributing to the formation of others' feelings, gradually aligning our feelings with a common view. This process fosters feelings of happiness and satisfaction for the well-being of ourselves and others, as well as feelings of pity for our own and others' misfortunes.

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