David Hume's Emotivism: Reason, Passion, and Moral Judgment
David Hume's Emotivist Ethics
Hume's philosophy involves the rejection of the possibility of basing ethics on reason. He rejects reason as the primary phenomenon governing moral action.
The Role of Reason and Passion
For Hume, the object of ethical study is actions that cause pleasure or displeasure (good or bad actions).
- Reason is exclusively limited to establishing the falsity or truth of statements.
- Reason is incapable of determining our actions or executing any action.
What truly moves us to act is not the situation itself, but the perspective of pleasure and displeasure that the situation may cause. Moral value judgments are determined by feelings.
Reason is the Slave of the Passions
Hume famously stated that Reason is the slave of the passions (a direct contrast to Plato, who believed Reason controls the passions).
Reason cannot discern what is good or bad because good or bad are not inherent properties of objects. Instead, they are feelings of evaluation that reside in our minds.
Moral Judgments and Feelings
We do not reject a conduct because it is inherently bad; rather, it is deemed bad because we reject it (it causes displeasure). The feeling determines what is good or bad.
If an act causes us no internal rejection, we might commit it even if we know it is socially immoral, provided there are no external constraints.
When the pursuit of pleasure threatens society, society has the right to prohibit it, establishing legality (e.g., prohibiting murder).
Hume's Empiricism and Theory of Knowledge
Hume is a radical empiricist, asserting: "All knowledge is derived from experience."
Core Tenets of Empiricism
- All knowledge originates in experience.
- Knowledge must be confirmed through experience. Any proposition that cannot be confirmed by experience lacks sense (except for mathematics and logic).
- There are no innate ideas.
Hume was influenced by Newton and based his philosophy on observation and experience. He believed that all contents of the mind come from perceptions.
Sources of Knowledge: Impressions and Ideas
Perceptions are divided into two types:
- Impressions: These are vivid and intense. Their durability is limited to the "here and now."
- Ideas: These are listed after impressions and are copies of them. Ideas are saved in the mind.
If an idea does not derive from an impression, the idea is considered nonsense. For Hume, something is true only if the idea corresponding to it comes from a prior impression.
Contrasting Hume and Plato on Ethics
The main difference between the two philosophers lies in the role of reason in morality.
Plato: Rational Ethics
For Plato, the man of reason is enlightened. To determine what is good is rational. By using reason, we can know if something is good or bad. Plato argues that before applying ethical criteria to the sensitive world, one must refer to the World of Ideas and the Idea of the Good (or Truth) to apply it rationally.
Thus, Plato's criterion for ethics is rational, and reason is the means to know it.
Hume: Subjective Ethics
Hume, conversely, argues that reason is the slave of man (passions). He does not believe that reason can ascertain if something is good or bad because ethics involves sensitive and subjective variables that reason cannot reach.
For Hume, the criterion for good or bad is a subjective question. Whether something is good or bad depends on the person and their point of view; good or bad are evaluations based on feeling.
We see how the field of ethics, for Hume, is sensitive and subjective. We desire something because it is good, and we reject something because it is bad—this is our point of view, conditioned by subjectivity and experiences.
Hume defends this thesis because he argues that feeling labels a fact as good or evil. If morality could be ascertained solely through reason, good or bad would be properties inherent to objects, which they are not.
Therefore, for Hume, the values of good and bad are strictly subjective.
This subjectivity explains why Hume suggests that most people would commit a "bad" act if no one else knew. They refrain from committing acts deemed bad by society only because of the unwanted consequences or punishment, not because of an objective moral truth.